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Abstract
Regime transitions are contagious according to the diffusion-of-democracy litera-
ture: a country’s regime is affected by others’ through various predefined networks
(e.g. geographical proximity), as well as by the country’s own political, economic
and social attributes (e.g. GDP levels). My account departs from the existing diffu-
sion theory by allowing for countries’ self-selection into peer regime networks based
on their democracy levels in the past. For example, a country can form stronger de-
pendency ties with countries that demonstrated similar democracy levels in the past
(homophily). In the longitudinal setting, the traditional diffusion mechanism with
the presence of self-selection generates the “co-evolutionary dynamic” between coun-
try networks and democracy levels. With this recursive feedback process between tie
formation and democracy levels, it becomes extremely difficult to evaluate empirically
how each country’s level of democracy is determined, because we need to distinguish
the following three processes statistically. First, country-specific attributes determine
the level of democracy as in the earliest democratization studies. Second, other states’
democracy levels also predict a country’s regime as demonstrated in the conventional
diffusion studies. Finally with my theory of endogenous network formation, the seem-
ing diffusion effect is partially a consequence of their self-selection into peer networks.
A newer spatial econometric model, an “M-STAR + Co-Evolution” model, is one of
the first that allows us to test for all of these three dynamics behind democratization.
In my first-cut analysis, I find that all three processes indeed exist.
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According to recent developments in the diffusion-of-democracy literature, regime transitions
are contagious. Empirical studies of diffusion show that democracy spreads through various
channels that determine the strength of interdependence among countries. These channels
of interdependence include, for example, geographical contiguity and trade volumes. This
implies that a country’s political regime is affected more by its neighbors and significant
economic partners than by distant countries and those with which it has little economic
contact. It also implies that as countries develop closer economic ties over time, their regime
dynamics will become more tightly interconnected.
The ultimate question that I want to answer is; how is a country’s democracy level deter-
mined? The theories presented in this paper are built on the existing studies that have
attempted to answer this long-standing question in political science. As in the earlier de-
mocratization theories, I think that country-specific internal and external attributes (the
GDP level, GDP growth, the war/peace status surrounding the country etc.) are important
predictors of their democracy levels. However, the literature has also demonstrated that we
could not predict a country’s regime development without taking into account the contagion
effects of others’ political regimes. The main question that this paper posits is about this
diffusion mechanism: what are the effects of others’ democracy levels through exogenous
“spatial” connectivities?1 In this paper, I re-examine the meaning of diffusion dynamics and
consider the possibility that countries select into peer networks that strengthen their regime
interdependence over time. By allowing for the endogenous selection of contagion paths,
my diffusion model can show how a country’s regime evolution could be path dependent,
influenced strongly by the surrounding conditions at a certain time-period in the past, while
traditional spatial models implicitly assume the irrelevance of the initial worldwide regime
distribution in predicting the regime evolution.
I will later introduce a new spatial econometric model, which has been developed in Hays,
Kachi and Franzese (2010), to estimate (1) the effects of each country’s socio-economic
attributes and international environments, (2) the strength of the diffusion effects through
various channels, and (3) to demonstrate the path-dependency in predicting political regimes
in the counterfactual analysis. I show that there is, in fact, a statistically significant effect
of endogenous interdependence on democratic development and therefore the over-time de-
velopment of political regimes around the world is path dependent.
1 Studies on the Diffusion of Democracy
Many believe in the intrinsic and non-instrumental value of more democratic regimes as
opposed to autocracies. The belief has been reinforced as we observed positive outcomes
associated with democratization, such as higher economic development level, lower levels
of violence and culture that values education, human rights, free media and so on. These
elements have been considered as both potential causes and consequences of democratization.
Naturally academics have attempted to disentangle the causality among these social and
1“Space” here is not necessarily geographical space.
3
political elements, and practitioners have been eager to find out whether these suspected
causes of democracy have any significant effects.
Most of the earlier democratization studies focus on estimating the effects of domestic socio-
economic factors on democracy and one of the most suspected links is the one between
economic development and democracy. This empirical question of whether economic devel-
opment induces democratic transitions arises partly from the theory of modernization that
Lipset (1959) posited half a century ago. Many scholars supported this idea of socio-economic
development as a prerequisite of democratization. The seminal work by Huntington (1991)
uses modernization theory to explain the emergence of the “third wave” of democracies that
started as late as the mid 1970’s. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) and Przeworski et al. (2000)
challenges this view, by empirically demonstrating that democratization occurs at random,
but a democracy will sustain more likely with higher GDP levels once democratization occurs.
Later some other scholars challenge Przeworski and Limongi (1997) and Przeworski et al.
(2000)’s finding by providing the opposite result (Boix, 2003; Boix and Stokes, 2003; Epstein
et al., 2006). Other country-specific attributes that have been considered and are considered
in this paper are the colonial history, economic growth, the proportion of country-specific
assets and religions.
At the same time, for scholars of international relations and geography who study spatial
patterns of political phenomena, topics such as regime type and war became the two most
popular areas to test their theories about diffusion mechanisms. The diffusion-of-democracy
studies emerged from this group of scholars almost independently from the studies of do-
mestic causes mentioned above. The common premise lying under this type of studies is
that political-regime type cannot be accurately predicted if we only look at a single country
or if we treat the levels of democracy across countries as independent outcomes. Earlier
works in “diffusion” focus on geographical clustering of regimes. Their careful tabulation,
mapping and graphing of geographically subsetted data demonstrate clustering of different
regime types in a given year (O’Loughlin et al., 1998; Starr, 1991; O’Loughlin, Staeheli and
Greenberg, 2004). These earlier spatial studies of democracy defined “space” narrowly as
geographical space. The connectivities among states through economic interdependence or
similar colonial history, for example, were not considered as spaces around which political
regimes might cluster. Also with their approaches, it is not possible to distinguish different
sources of spatial clustering–common exposure, exogenous diffusion or endogenous diffusion,
even though the studies were framed as “diffusion” studies of democracy. The spatial asso-
ciation of political regimes that they demonstrated could be the consequence of diffusion as
they implied, but it could also have been due to the fact that some countries are exposed
to common conditions that happened to be spatially clustered, such as GDP per capita,
economic inequality, the average education level and the war-peace condition that is sur-
rounding the country. In this sense, the earlier geo-political studies of democracies were not
precisely about testing for the diffusion mechanisms.
In the past few years, as scholars have become increasingly aware of the importance of both
the common-condition-based and diffusion-based spatial correlations of political regimes, and
as they have developed more flexible estimation methods, more unified models of democrati-
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zation have started to emerge (Beck, Gleditsch and Beardsley, 2006; Brinks and Coppedge,
2006; Gleditsch and Ward, 2006). Gleditsch and Ward (2006) provide a model of regime
transition –both transition to democracy and reversion to autocracy– including domestic
and international country-specific attributes (logged GDP per capita, logged energy con-
sumption, civil war, peace/war status) and the factors that somewhat captures the influence
of other countries’ regimes (global and local proportions of neighboring democracies). This
approach still assumes the exogeneity of other states’ regimes and the way others’ regimes
enter the model is not any different from that of country-specific attributes. Beck, Gleditsch
and Beardsley (2006) overcome this issue by applying their spatial econometric model to a
cross-sectional analysis of democracy. Their model explicitly explains a state’s democracy
level by other states’ levels, weighting the strength of others’ influences by exogenously given
connectivities among the countries. There are two “spatial” connectivities introduced in their
model: one is trade volumes and the other is geographical proximity. The main contribution
is that, by introducing the connectivity weights among countries, they explicitly modeled
contagion of political regimes and distinguished the contagion effect from the effects of other
country-specific covariates that could also induce spatial clustering in political regimes. An-
other contribution of their approach to the literature is to demonstrate that “space is more
than geography” by introducing the idea of weighting the effect of others’ regimes by how
economically (trade volumes) and geographically (distance) close the countries are.
2 The Initial Conditions Puzzle
Even though each of the above-mentioned and many related studies has its own strengths
and limitations– both conceptually and methodologically– it is evident that the questions
that motivate these studies are more or less equivalent to what I asked at the beginning:
(1) what are the effects of countries’ socio-economic attributes and environments on their
democracy levels, and (2) what are the effects of others’ democracy levels through “spatial”
connectivities?
All of the existing empirical analyses to my knowledge (whether mentioned above or not),
however, implicitly assume that the worldwide distribution of political regime at one time-
period does not affect a country’s future regime development. As shocking as it is, this is true
even to the fairly recent diffusion studies that utilize spatial econometric models. Imagine
two counterfactual worlds with very different regime distributions as depicted in Figure 1.
The white part indicates democracy and black indicates autocracy in these counterfactual
dichotomous worlds. If a country indicated with a dot is born in the two different worlds,
or if there is an exogenous democratic/autocratic shock to this country in these different
environments, would we except that the country will experience the same regime development
in the long run? I find this assumption problematic.
There can be a number of different ways that a country’s democracy level depends on the past
distribution of regimes around the world. The key factor that generates the path-dependent
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Figure 1: Two Maps Representing Different Distributions of Political Regimes
regime evolution is the constantly-changing relationships between two countries’ democracy
levels, for every pair of the countries. Note that it is not merely the proportion of democracies
in the world that we think affects countries’ regime trajectory: both maps in Figure 1 have
more or less 50-50 proportion of the two regime types but we expect different long-term
consequences. In this study, I develop a theory that countries’ democracy levels reinforce
each other positively or negatively over time and emphasize this self-selection (into or out
of the regime networks) as a source of path-dependence. This is equivalent to asking all else
equal, are political regimes more influenced by those that are currently similar or dissimilar?
Or will countries look to others with different regimes to find institutional innovations? The
existing works on policy-learning suggest that learning more likely occurs among units that
are similar, but works on coercion-based policy-diffusion suggests otherwise. Despite the fact
that the differences in the two logics have significant implications for what democratization
scholars and the promoters of democratization would predict, the effects of other states’
regimes that travel through regime similarity/difference have never been a central focus of
the diffusion literature. I call this type of diffusion “endogenous diffusion” and define it
as the process in which the structure of the connectivities among actors are endogenously
determined by the behavioral choices of the actors in the previous time period, generating
a “co-evolving” dynamic between the connectivities and the outcomes. We could call the
traditional contagion process “exogenous diffusion”. This is diffusion that occurs through
exogenously-determined channels, such as trade flows and geographical proximity, where we
do not need to observe each country’s democracy level (value of the dependent variable) of
the past time-period to construct the connectivity among them in the following time-period.
To understand how the endogenous diffusion process is distinct from the traditional (exoge-
nous) diffusion process, two aspects are worth noting. First, this particular type of diffusion
has a distinct characteristic where the strength of ties among countries is now determined
by the similarities in their regime scores, and at the same time the regime scores themselves
are the outcome quantities to be explained in the diffusion models. Some network-analysis
scholars call this phenomenon “homophily”– love of the same. More generally this can be
thought of as a “selection” mechanism. Regardless of how it is called, one of the most impor-
tant aspects of this co-evolution/homophily/selection mechanism is its implication for the
magnitude of diffusion channeled by exogenous connectivities such as trade volumes and bor-
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ders. Ignoring the diffusion mechanism driven by co-evolution likely inflates the estimated
exogenous-diffusion effect given counterfactual shocks to covariates.
Secondarily, and more importantly, the qualitative difference in the long-run implications
of the exogenous and endogenous diffusion dynamics is not trivial. The predicted long-run-
equilibrium regimes for the system that only contains the exogenous diffusion, as in the
existing diffusion literature, is path-independent, while that of endogenous diffusion is path-
dependent. Simply put, regardless of the initial values, a country’s long-run equilibrium
regime deterministically reaches a certain level, given a set of parameter estimates. Suppose
there were two worlds with very different distributions of political regimes; for example,
democracies dominate in one world but autocracies dominate in the other world. If we derive
the long-run democracy levels of a certain country in these completely different counterfactual
worlds using the existing diffusion (spatial) models, the level of the country’s democracy will
eventually reach exactly the same levels in these two worlds. Which countries in the world
have more democratic regimes in a certain year and how a country was connected to others
in that particular time period do not matter to the country’s long-run democracy level in
this framework. Hence the path of the long-run political development is deterministic, solely
depending on the initial conditions. However, it should be intuitive for any social scientist
that two worlds with different distributions of regimes have very different implications for
the political development of a country.
My empirical analysis of the diffusion of democracy attempts to distinguish the exogenous
diffusion from the endogenous diffusion. Mechanically, the two diffusion processes–exogenous
and endogenous– look extremely similar on the surface, in that I model the endogenous con-
tagion as an influence of other countries’ regimes that are weighted by the distance of their
pair-wise political regimes of each pair of countries. The pair-wise distance of regimes is just
like the weights that contain pair-wise trade volumes and border-sharing in the exogenous
diffusion. However, in addition to the substantive importance of the similarity effects, the
statistically-significant effect of the exogenous diffusion implies that we would likely overesti-
mate the confidence of counterfactual regime predictions if we do not allow for the endogenous
process. This is due to the path-dependent (non-linear) nature of the regime-development
dynamic that is caused by co-evolution. Not surprisingly, the estimation method for testing
the endogenous contagion adds significant complication to the existing spatial-econometric
approach that Beck, Gleditsch and Beardsley (2006) utilized.
This is not to say that the notion of endogenous diffusion has been completely ignored in the
current literature. Brinks and Coppedge (2006) attempt to answer the following question:
among all the neighboring countries, would it be a similar or different regimes that a country
mimics in terms of the level of democracy? This question has two main components: one
is its implicit assumption that countries give influence on each other’s regime through their
regime similarity or dissimilarity only if they are geographically close. This is why the
authors look only at the effect of regime distance among countries that are geographically
close. The second important component is that among neighboring countries, the authors
attempt to assess the effects of others’ regimes through being similar/dissimilar to the others.
The mechanism that Brinks and Coppedge (2006) attempt to analyze is somewhat similar
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to what I call the co-evolutionary or endogenous diffusion process, in which the outcome
measure itself defines the connectivities of the outcomes. The difference between Brinks
and Coppedge (2006) and my views is that they limit the possibility of the path-dependent
diffusion to the countries in arbitrarily-defined neighborhoods of a certain size. Also the
estimation methodology that they use cannot estimate the true contagion effect–the effects of
the regime proximity enters their empirical model just as country-specific common conditions
and it assumes that the regime similarity is exogenous. As a consequence of the empirical
strategy, the interesting path-dependent nature of the regime-development dynamic is never
an issue of debate in their analysis.
The empirical analyses in this paper introduce a new spatial-econometric model developed
in Hays, Kachi and Franzese (2010). It allows us to test for a unified model of democracy
levels, by distinguishing the effects of country-specific attributes (common-exposure), others’
democracy levels that travel through the exogenously-given ties (exogenous-diffusion) as in
the existing diffusion studies, and through the ties that are endogenously defined by the past
democracy levels (endogenous-diffusion).
3 The Empirical Strategy
The empirical analysis is to assess how states’ democracy levels influence those of other
states’ after controlling for the effects of country-specific common conditions. Furthermore
the model needs to be able to capture the two kinds of diffusion effects. To answer these
questions, I estimate a multiparametric spatio-temporal autoregressive (M-STAR) model
with co-evolutionary dynamics. This is an extension of existing M-STAR models, which
contain multiple spatial lags but not the term that captures the co-evolutionary dynamic.
Hays, Kachi and Franzese (2010) provides technical descriptions of the empirical model in
detail.
The key properties of the M-STAR-plus-co-evolution model are the following. First, the






y + φMy + γLy + Xβ + ε, (1)
where y, continuous democracy scores, is an NT × 1 column vector of cross sections stacked
by periods. Throughout the paper, i = {1, · · · , N} denote countries and t = {1, · · · , T}
denote time periods included in the data. Note that the dataset does not have to have the
balanced-panel structure; i.e., the number of countries included in a given time period, Nt,
could vary over time due to data availability and deaths and births of countries. In total,∑
t
Nt observational units are included in the entire dataset. For simplicity (in terms of
writing), however, I will describe the model as if the dataset had a balanced-panel structure,
denoting the total number of observations by NT . This does not change the properties of
this estimator.
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The notation β on the right-hand side captures the effects of various country-specific covari-
ates included in X. If there are K covariates in total, then β is a K × 1 column vector and
X is an NT × K matrix. In my specification, X contains logged GDP per capita and the
constant term. If any of these explanatory variables happen to be spatially clustered, then
the term Xβ controls for the seeming spatial correlations observed in the outcomes variable,
y.
Similarly, φ represents the effect of one-year lag of a country’s own democracy score. Since
this first-order temporal lag is a country-specific exogenous (pre-determined) variable, it can
also be treated as one of the X variable and can be included in the Xβ term. The time-lag
matrix M is an NT ×NT matrix that conveniently maps yit onto i’s own past value yi,t−1.
This notation allows us to use the vector y instead of yt−1 and this will provide us with a
more intuitive expression of the reduced form equation later.





y captures the exogenous diffusion. The
indicator r = {1, · · · , R} denotes different kinds of connectivity through which a country’s
regime influence others’. Suppose we have a theory that the economic interdependence
measured by trade volumes partially determines to what extent a country is influenced by
the others’ political regimes. Each cell, wij, of the observable and exogenous weights matrix
Wtrade contains the pair-wise trade volume between country i and j. Since the trade volume
is defined as the sum of import and export, the Wtrade matrix is symmetric. For example,
suppose there are only three countries, A, B, and C, and the trade volumes among these
countries are as in Table 1. Table 1 implies that the extent to which B and C’s regimes
influence A’s regime is 3/10 and 7/10 respectively.
Table 1: Imaginary Trade Volumes among Countries A, B and C
Country A B C Row total
A 0 3 7 10
B 3 0 5 8
C 7 5 0 12
Then the weights matrix that corresponds with the chart in Table 1 is as in equation (2).
Note that conventionally we row-standardize the values in weights matrices. As can be seen
in equation (2), ρr is the estimated coefficient for the effects of others’ regimes through this
particular type of connectivity, r. In my specification, there are two kinds of exogenous-
diffusion channels: one is trade volume and the other is border-sharing. In other words,
in the model I estimate, R = 2. Note that, even though W’s are exogenously given and
the coefficient that we estimate is only the ρ, the overall effect of other countries’ regimes
9










The term γLy captures the effects of the endogenous diffusion. The matrix L is an NT×NT
“regime-distance” matrix with |yi,t−1 − yj,t−1| in cells (it, jt). The L matrix plays the role
of a weights matrix just as a Wr does in the exogenous-diffusion term. The difference is
that each element of L is defined as a distance between the political regimes of each pair of
countries. Adding this term, γLy, therefore reflects a substantive proposition that countries
with more dissimilar political regimes affect each other’s political regimes more if γ > 0, and
less if γ < 0.





















ρrWr − φM− γL
)
.
Finally, the likelihood function is












assuming that ε ∼ N(0, σ2INT ), i.i.d.
3.1 The Long-Run Implications of the Co-Evolutionary Dynamic
The methodological complication and the interesting dynamic caused by the co-evolution
between y and L, which never existed in the traditional spatial models, becomes evident
when we rewrite the model for a cross-section given a time-period t. First, the structural-










yt + Xtβ + εt, (5)
















where yt, Wr,t and X are N × 1, N × N and N × K matrices. The matrix Π is N × N2
and it is produced by horizontally concatenating N separate N ×N block matrices. The ith
N×N matrix in Π has −1’s on its diagonal and 1’s for each element of the ith column except
for the element (i, i), which is 0 as are all other unspecified elements in Π. For example, if
N = 3,
Π =
 0 0 0 −1 1 0 −1 0 11 −1 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1
1 0 −1 0 1 −1 0 0 0
 . (7)
As can be seen in equation (6), the presence of the regime-distance connectivity, L, ren-
ders the N -equation system nonlinear in the endogenous variable, y. This significantly
complicates calculations of the predicted effects. In fact, there is no analytical solution for
the steady-state regime levels anymore, and the long-run responses (democracy levels) to
changes in the covariates X must be calculated recursively. This is why the predicted long-
run democracy levels are path dependent and the level(s) to which the system converges
varies across different starting values of y.
It is useful to compare this model with the one for a simple M-STAR model that does
not contain the endogenous-diffusion term. The structural form of (a cross section of) the





ρrWrtyt + φyt−1 + Xtβ + εt. (8)
Unlike equation (5), one can analytically compute the steady-state (long-run) outcomes by
equating yt−1 to yt and fixing the exogenous right-hand-side variables to their counterfactual
permanent post-shock levels;
yt = (I− ρW − φI)−1(Xtβ + εt). (9)
4 Variables and Data
The dependent variable is the level of democracy and the data are from the Unified Democ-
racy Scores (UDS) constructed in Pemstein, Meserve and Melton (2010). A Bayesian latent
variable approach, originally introduced in Treier and Jackman (2008), allows them to es-
timate the latent levels of democracy, integrating ten different existing democracy scores2.
The UDS data provide a continuous measure of democracy levels in 67 to 191 countries,
depending on years, from 1946 through 2000. For the empirical analyses here, I use UDS for
the 1950-2000 time-period, and take the 5-year average to create a 10-time-block time-series-
cross-sectional regime data. Taking the 5-year average has a couple of advantages. One is
2The ten measures are Arat (2003), Bowman, Lehoucq and Mahoney (2005), Bollen (2001), Freedom in
the World 2007 (2007), Hadenius (1992), Przeworski et al. (2000), Marshall and 2006 (N.d.), Coppedge and
W.H. (1991), Gasiorowski (1996), Vanhanen (2003).
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simply to reduce the dimension of the data set. With hundreds of observational units within
each year, the matrix dimension, (the number of observations across time and units)×(the
number of observations across time and units) can easily become very large.3 More impor-
tantly, by taking the average, I could alleviate possibly erroneous fluctuations of democracy
scores, which is a major concern often raised by the believers of dichotomous or trichoto-
mous democracy scores as an argument against continuous scores. Figure 2 demonstrates
Figure 2: Summary of the Democracy Scores (Dependent Variable) by Time Period
Note: Data source: Pemstein, Meserve and Melton (2008)
summary statistics of the democracy score for each of the 9 time-periods.4 The scores range
3For example, suppose the dataset includes 50 years and each year includes 100 countries. The dimension
of weights matrices would become 5000-by-5000 and it incurs a substantial computational burden. It did
not appear to me as a good strategy at this preliminary stage of the project to use such a large dataset.
4The ten time periods that I created by taking the five-year averages are; (0) 1951-1955, (1) 1956-1960,
(2) 1961-1965, (3) 1966-1970, (4) 1971-1975, (5) 1976-1980, (6) 1981-1985, (7) 1986-1990, (8) 1991-1995, (9)
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approximately from -2 to 2, and the means (indicated by vertical lines) are roughly around
0 in all time-periods.5 To get a sense of how countries are ranked in a given year, I plotted
the democracy score of each country for the last time period, 1996-2000 (or “year 9”), in
Figure 3.
Each of the two main model specifications consists of three parts. First, following Lipset’s so-
cial and economic requisites theory, the models contain country-specific social and economic
attributes. A number of earlier democratization studies argue that the economic develop-
ment level is positively associated with countries’ democracy scores(Huntington, 1991; Boix,
2003; Boix and Stokes, 2003). To allow the possible curve-linear relationship between the
economic development and the democracy levels, I include real GDP per capita and the
squared term, (real GDP per capita)2.6 The data are taken from Gleditsch (2002) and it
measures the real GDP per capita in thousands of constant U.S. dollars with the base year
being 1996. Another economic variable is growth rate. Scholars have emphasized the impor-
tance of growth in explaining democratization and consolidation of democracies, but have
found weak or no empirical evidence of economic growth. It might be due to multiple com-
peting forces that growth can generate. As Boix (2003) theorizes, “[t]he possibility that low
taxes may spur faster economic growth may entice the poor to commit to moderate levels
of redistribution” and that “‘should, in turn, reduce the wealthy’s opposition to universal
suffrage and hence facilitate the introduction of democracy.” With this mechanism, economic
growth should be positively correlated with the level of democracy. As the author points out,
this mechanism works only when the country has some political institution that ensures that
the poor abide by their commitment to maintain the taxes low once democratization occurs.
However, another possibility is that growth might reduce the level of economic grievances
among the repressed. With this mechanism, economic growth should reduce the force to
mobilize population and should be negatively correlated with the occurrence of democrati-
zation. I should note that this demobilization force can be realized only in the authoritarian
regimes that have some (imperfect) political institution that ensures redistribution not only
among the elites but also among the poor as well. The variable, growth rate, is computed
as the log difference of the real GDP levels. The last economic variable is fuel export that
measures the percentage of a country’s fuel export of all the merchandise exports. The
data are taken from the World Development Indicator (the World Bank). When a country
democratizes, it usually means that the government enfranchises the poor/repressed. This
moves the median voter position from somewhere in the wealthy group to a point in the then
repressed group, resulting in higher taxes for the rich than in the former authoritarian regime
(Boix, 2003). While owners of relatively mobile business, such as manufacturers, could move
their production sites outside the country if higher taxes are implemented, fuel (or natural
1996-2000. As I explain later, one of the explanatory variables is a one-time-period lag of the dependent
variable. Consequently time-period (0) drops out of the dependent variable, leaving nine time periods,
(1)-(9), in the final dataset.
5Unlike commonly-used democracy scores, such as Polity IV, the UDS are not restricted to a certain
range. Each country’s democracy score, estimated as its posterior mean, happens to have fallen between
about -2 and 2.
6Later I tried estimating the models with the logged real GDP/capita variable instead of GDP/capita
and (GDP/capita)2. Qualitatively the results remained unchanged.
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Figure 3: Democracy Scores of the 175 Countries included in the 1996-2000 Time Block
Note: Data source: Pemstein, Meserve and Melton (2008)
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resources in general) is a highly location-specific asset and it would be difficult for the rich
to “move” the production sites when the tax rates increase (Boix, 2003). Therefore in the
fuel-rich countries, the rich have an incentive to block democratization movements and we
should expect the negative effect of the fuel export rate on democracy scores.
The commonwealth variable is a dummy indicating the commonwealth membership. This
variable is to capture the possible legacy of British colonization.7 Due to the imposed British
political institutions during the colonial era, these countries might have some political at-
tributes in common with Britain that might lead to stable democratic regimes like the British
one, regardless of their own political history before or after the colonization. Another socio-
political variable is urban population rate. I expect that the urban population rate would be
positively correlated with democracy for a couple of reasons. First, the urban population is
more likely exposed to foreign culture, among which can be democratic countries. Second,
higher degrees of urbanization imply higher population concentration. This could facilitate,
in conjunction with the exposure to more democratic foreign culture, solving the collective
actions that are oftentimes a key to overturn the dictatorial incumbents either by voting
for the democratic opposition or revolting against the government. A concern might be
that the urban population rate tends to increase as a country experiences economic devel-
opment and it might be difficult to distinguish the effects of the urban population rate and
other economic-status variables. Following Przeworski et al. (2000), three religion variables–
catholic, muslim and protestant– are also included. Each measures the time-invariant per-
centage of the population that belongs to the religious group. The data are mainly from
Przeworski et al. (2000) and for the countries that are not included in Przeworski et al.
(2000), the current issue of the CIA World Factbook are used. As Przeworski et al. (2000)
mention by citing Lipset (1959), Protestantism’s emphasis on individualism and self-reliance
is said to nurture democratic values while Catholicism “was antithetical to democracy in
pre-World War II Europe and Latin America.” Therefore we should expect to observe the
positive association between protestant and democracy, but negative between catholic and
democracy.
Lastly, the temporal lag variable is a one-year lag of a country’s own democracy score. It
controls for the history of the country’s regime. If a country has a fairly democratic regime
in one time period, then it is most likely that the democracy score of the country in the
following time period is not too far away from the past score.8
It is important to control for these country-specific attributes not only because of each
substantive rationale that I mentioned above. It is also because controlling for some of
these socio-economic variables is essential to extract the “true diffusion” or “true” spatial-
7Later I should change this to a variable that indicates only former British colonies and not the common-
wealth membership.
8Overall the set of these country-specific variables is very similar to the one Przeworski et al. (2000) have
in one of their fuller models. The differences are that my specifications do not include variables that capture
social fragmentation, such as ethnic and religious fragmentation, and also that I control for the effects of
fuel export when they do not. Another important source of social divide that I do not have in my current
specifications is income inequality, which is a key variable in Boix (2003). I plan to include these variable as
soon as I collect them.
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interdependence of the democracy level, which is the central theme of this project (Franzese
and Hays, 2006, 2007, 2008). What does this mean? Supposed that we believe political
regimes diffuse among countries through geographical connectivity; i.e., a country’s democ-
racy level is affected more by that of geographically closer others than that of distant others.
At the same time, suppose it is the case that the similar levels of GDP/capita are geo-
graphically clustered. Finally suppose that we observe geographical clustering also in the
dependent variable– the democracy score– as well. Now for the geographical clustering of
democracy scores, two completely different explanations can co-exist. One is that political
regimes spread among neighbors based on the geographical proximity of the countries. When
there is an increase in the democracy score of a certain country, the democratic shock affects
closer countries more than distant countries. This is one way we can observe geographical
clustering in the regime score, and we consider this as a “true” diffusion or interdependent
mechanism. However, the same clustering in the dependent variable can also be observed
when each country’s political regime responds similarly to a similar economic development
level– one of the country-specific variables. In this mechanism, countries are responding to
their own levels of the economic variable independently, and there is no diffusion of regime
type. In this case, what we observe is, in fact, mere spatial clustering/association of the
dependent variable, but it is not diffusion or interdependence. In the real world the two
mechanisms can co-exist, and therefore it is important to include variables that capture
both mechanisms in order to distinguish the two.
The second category of the explanatory variables is exogenous connectivity. As exogenous
regime-diffusion channels, the model includes trade volume and border. Each of these weights
matrices is multiplied by the outcome variable, democracy score. The overall product of the
weights and the outcome variable represents other countries’ democracy levels weighted by
the strength of ties between each pair of countries. What is estimated in the regression
models is the coefficient parameter attached to the whole product. This parameter captures
how much the particular kind of connectivity matters in the context of democracy diffusion.
In other words, for a certain pair of countries A and B, even if B’s democracy score is very
high and the tie between A and B is very strong, we should conclude that the diffusion
through this particular connectivity does not exist, if the coefficient parameter attached
to this term is estimated to be statistically not significant. The connectivity matrix trade
volume is a proxy for the economic interdependence among the countries. The rationale to
include the trade weights is that countries’ political conditions tend to become more similar
when they are economically interdependent. Each entry of the trade weights measures the
sum of the import and the export (in millions of current-year U.S. dollars) for each pair of
two countries and the data are taken from Gleditsch (2002). In some existing studies, trade
volumes are divided by the effect-receiving countries’ total GDP levels. The logic behind this
practice is that the influence through trade volumes depends on how significant the volume
is compared to the overall economic size of the effect-receiving country. A disadvantage of
this practice is that it becomes unclear as to exactly which affects the outcome quantity,
an increase/decrease in trade volumes or a decrease/increase in GDP. For this reason, the
trade measure in my empirical analyses is a simple sum of import and export. The other
connectivity matrix border is different from the trade matrix in that all the entries of the
matrix are binary, 0 or 1. In this preliminary empirical study, the geographical contiguity is
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defined strictly as countries that share inland borders. The data are taken from the “Direct
Contiguity Data, 1816-2006 (Version 3.1. Online: http://correlatesofwar.org)” in the
Correlates of War Project (Stinnett et al., 2002). The most strict definition of contiguity
(“type 1” in the COW dataset) is used.9 Both trade volume and border matrices are row-
standardized.
The third and the most important category of the explanatory variables is the influence
of others’ regimes through the endogenous tie strength. The connectivity matrix for the
endogenous diffusion consists of the distances of pair-wise regimes. Each cell (it, jt) contains
the value |yi,t−1− yj,t−1|, where yi,t−1 are taken from the UDS. The endogenous connectivity
matrix is also row-standardized.
All of the regression models include time and region dummies. The nine time dumies are for
the periods of (1) 1956-1960, (2) 1961-1965, (3) 1966-1970, (4) 1971-1975, (5) 1976-1980, (6)
1981-1985, (7) 1986-1990, (8) 1991-1995, (9) 1996-2000, and the dummy variable for the last
time period, (9), s dropped from the regression equations. The eight region dummies are for
(1) Africa, (2) North America, (3) Central and South America, (4) Asia, (5) Middle East,
(6) Western Europe, (7) Eastern and Central Europe and (8) Oceania. The eighth regional
dummy for Oceania is dropped from the regression equation.
5 Empirical Results and Discussions
What country-specific political and economic conditions lead to more democratic regimes?
Are there diffusion effects in political regimes? Are countries’ political regimes more likely
affected by countries with already similar regimes, or dissimilar regimes? Table 2 reports
the results of the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation of M-STAR models with the co-
evolutionary dynamic.
Recall the regression equation;





y + γLy + ε. (10)
With the actual variables and the connectivity matrices that are included in the model, the
following model is fitted.
y =
{














9By this definition, for example, Korea and Japan, which are separated by the sea are not “neighbors”.
This definition seems too strict for the purpose of this study. In the next iteration, I am going to use a
different contiguity definition, or the distance between countries as Beck, Gleditsch and Beardsley (2006) do.
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where y is the continuous democracy scores from the UDS. The terms in the first curly brack-
ets are for the country-specific variables, including time and region dummies. The matrix
Xc.specific contains all the non-diffusion determinants of democracy, such as real GDP/capita,
(real GDP/capita)2, growth rate, commonwealth, urban pop rate, fuel export, catholic, mus-
lim, protestant. These are the domestic or international determinants to which countries’s
democracy scores independently respond and have nothing to do with the diffusion mech-
anism. The second and the third curly brackets contain the possible diffusion processes.
The second part is for diffusion through exogenously-shaped connectivities, border and trade
volume. The third part is for the diffusion through endogenously-shaped ties, and this term
generates the co-evolutionary dynamic between the outcome variable and the connectivity
L, which consists of the pairwise difference of the regie score (y) from the previous time
period.
Model (1) is a non-spatial specification and Model (2) is a traditional multiple-spatial-lag
model without the co-evolution term. The likelihood-ration (LR) tests find that the difference
between Model (1) and (2), and Model (2) and (3) are statistically significant (with the LRs
being 21.64 and 8.9 respectively, and the chi-square critical values being 13.82 and 6.63
respectively at the significance level of 1%). It is likely that the non-spatial model (1)
suffers from omitted variable bias and it shows up in the overestimated degree of temporal
persistency.
My discussion will, therefore, focus on the spatial models (2), (3) and (4). Both Model (3)
and (4) utilize the new spatial econometric technique to evaluate the diffusion of democ-
racy allowing for the co-evolutionary dynamic. The only difference between (3) and (4) is
that Model (4) contains all the country-specific explanatory variables that I considered for
this study, based on substantive theories and following the conventions in the traditional
democratization literature. However, the LR test suggests that Model (3) is the preferred
specification. Even after adding six more explanatory variables, the LR test cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the added parameters in Model (4) are jointly zero. (LR= 8.34,
the chi-square critical value with the degrees of freedom 6= 10.65 at the significance level of
10%.) I left Model (4) in the results table to demonstrate the entire list of variables that I
consider, but I will use Model (3) to conduct additional analyses in the later sections.
In interpreting the magnitude of the coefficient estimates, it is important to note that,
for most time-periods, the democracy scores of the 75 to 175 countries lie in the range
approximately between -2 and 2. For example, in the 1991-1995 time-block (“year 8”),
the data include 154 countries. This implies that only about a 0.026-unit increase in the
democracy score is necessary, on average, for a country to catch up with the next higher-
ranked democracy.
The real GDP/capita variables are both highly statistically significant and the signs indicate
that there is a curve-linear relationship between the real GDP per capita level and the
democracy score where the level of democracy goes up as the income level increases with a
diminishing curvature. The result suggests that, for a middle income country, the democracy
score could increase by as much as 0.13, as real GDP/capita increases by one unit, or
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Table 2: Estimation Results: Regressions of the Unified Democracy Scores on the Country-
Attribute Variables and Other States’ Democracy Scores
Beck et al. OLS M-STAR M-STAR + Co-Evolution
(Cross-sec.) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Common Constant -13.24∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.099 0.099 0.078
exposure -3.11 (0.063) (0.067) (0.069) (0.080)
(β, φ) Temporal lag 0.862∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Real GDP/cap 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
(Real GDP/cap)2 -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗





Urban pop rate 0.001
(0.0006)
Fuel export rate -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.0009∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗









Exogenous Geog Distance 0.89∗∗∗
connectivity (0.19)
(ρ) Borders 0.053∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Trade 0.59 0.105∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.1090∗∗∗
(0.43) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Endogenous Regime distance -0.104∗ -0.098∗
connectivity (0.055) (0.055)
(γ)
Other σ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗
parameters (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Time dummies? NA Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies? No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -279.039 -268.219 -263.769 -259.601
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%. Note that Beck, Gleditsch and
Beardsley (2006)’s results are based on a cross-sectional specification with the 1998 data. Their dependent variable is from the
Polity IV data. The dependent variable of Model (1)-(4) is the Unified Democracy Scores derived in Pemstein, Meserve and
Melton (2008). Model (1) is an assumed-independence model, where spatial interdependence is assumed to be zero. Model (2)
is a simple M-STAR model with no co-evolutionary dynamic; i.e., all the spatial lags are pre-determined. Model (3) and (4)
are M-STAR models with the co-evolutionary dynamic; i.e., these models also include the regime-distance “spatial” lag that
is endogenous over time. All the models are estimated with eight temporal dummies and seven regional dummies. The seven
regions are Africa, North America, Central and South America, Asia, Middle East, Western Europe and Eastern Europe. The
eighth regional dummy for Oceania is dropped from the regression equation.19
$1000. This is equivalent to say, on average, a middle income country could improve its
democracy ranking by 5, all else equal. However, the growth rate, as the log-difference of
the real GDP/capita levels, turns out not statistically significant. This result confirms the
basic findings both in Przeworski et al. (2000) and Boix (2003). Przeworski et al. (2000)
points to the asymmetry of the effect of growth in democracies and autocracies. They find
that democracies are more sensitive to economic crises (or sudden negative growths) than
autocracies. Another possibility, as I mentioned in the previous section, is the existence of
multiple competing forces that growth can generate. In countries where the poor can make
a credible commitment to maintain moderate tax rates in the potential future democracy,
growth could increase the the propensity of democratic transitions, because the poor take
the growing economy as an opportunity to receive more redistribution even at an unfair
redistributive rate (the rate is low but the pie itself is growing fast enough to make the
benefit sufficient) and the elite/rich are convinced that, even after the democratization,
the tax they will incur is sufficiently small. At the same time, in autocracies where there
is a modest redistributive system, the level of economic grievances could be too low for
the repressed to stand against the authoritarian incumbent when the economy grows fast.
Without controlling for such institutional differences across countries, it is impossible to
entangle the complex effects of growth.
Another country-specific variable that consistently turns out significant is fuel export rate
. Even though the magnitude is very low, a percent increase in fuel export (out of all the
merchandise exports) seems to decrease the democracy score by 0.0009 all else equal. It
should be noted that Model (3) also includes a dummy for the Middle East region, which is
a typical oil-rich region, and both the region dummy and the fuel export rate are statistically
significant, at the 5% and the 1% significance levels respectively. This is strong evidence
of the fuel effect or the country-specific-asset effect on democracy, confirming one of Boix
(2003)’s main claims.
All the other country-specific variables turn out to be statistically insignificant. The results
are very robust in that regardless of the combination of these common-exposure variables,
only the coefficients of temporal lag, real GDP/capita, (real GDP/capita)2 and fuel export rate
are statistically significant most of the time and not others. These results are not necessarily
surprising. Przeworski et al. (2000) also find weak or no results of the religion dummies.
In my Model (4), the muslim variable has a modestly significant and negative effect on
democracy, but the Middle East region dummy in this specification becomes not significant
while it is almost always significant in other specifications. From this, there is no way to tell
empirically whether it is something about the Middle East region in general that prevents
democratization, or whether there is something particular about their culture related to the
religion. Also the high correlation between urbanization and economic development might
be the reason why the coefficient for urban population rate is not statistically different from
zero.
Finally, all the specifications find strong significant and positive effects of the temporal lag,
confirming that history of each country’s regime matters and the magnitude is large.
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Now let us look at the estimated coefficients related to the diffusion and self-selection. The
estimates for the exogenous-diffusion terms (ρ’s), in all three spatial models, uncover positive
interdependence of political regimes through the geographical and economic ties. Note the
the strength of the effects of other countries’ democracy scores through a particular connec-
tivity can be computed as ρˆrWr; i.e., the information we can obtain from the coefficient
ρ’s themselves is merely to what extent the connectivity of units matters overall, and it is
not the magnitude of “influence” that other countries’ regimes have. I will later compute
the overall strength of other’s influence in the next section. What we can learn from the
significant estimates of border and trade is that to whom others and to what extent a country
is connected matter in predicting a country’s democracy level.
Finally the main contribution of this paper, the influence of other regimes through regime
distance, is uncovered by the estimate of γ. The coefficients are negative and statistically
significant. Note that the connectivity matrix L carries the information about the “mag-
nitude” of the pairwise regime dissimilarity; i.e., all the entries are absolute values of the
distance between political regimes of any given two countries. Since all the entries of L are
greater than or equal to 0, the negative estimate of γ combined with the positive estimate for
ρr’s implies that a country’s political regime influences those of countries with more similar
regimes than dissimilar regimes: homophily in other words. This could imply that countries
with similar democracy levels become more similar over time as if they were reinforcing each
other’s regime type, possibly generating several regime “blocs” in the long run. It should be
noted that these regime blocs/clubs are not necessarily clustered geographically, if the effect
of regime-similarity-based contagion is substantial compared to the effect of geography-based
contagion, for example. I will discuss the long-term distribution of political regimes around
the world in the later section on counterfactual simulations.
I have developed this somewhat unified model of the diffusion of democracy, building on the
accumulated knowledge about the determinants of democratization in the existing studies.
From the coefficient estimates of the most preferred specification, (3), we can conclude that
countries’ regime scores are highly correlated with some country-specific factors, such as their
economic status and the asset specificity. After controlling for the effects of such variables, I
find empirical evidence that there is true interdependence in countries’ democracy levels and
that geographical contiguity and trade volumes are at least partially defining the strength
of this interdependence. Moreover, as I suspected, the democracy scores achieved by these
countries in a certain time period partially determine the degrees of regime influence among
them in the next time period. Even though it is difficult to see the magnitude of the
selection bias in the coefficient estimates, it is suggestive that what we thought before was
the diffusion of regimes occurring through exogenous ties is in fact partly due to the fact
that countries with similar regime scores are more likely to have strong ties precisely because
of their similarity in regimes scores. In other words, countries are selecting themselves into
regime networks that in turn shape their next-stage democracy levels. Before the M-STAR
model with co-evolutionary dynamics, we could not test for the possibility of this selection.
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6 Estimated Latent Regime Interdependence and Coun-
terfactual Analyses
There are a number of different ways to use the information obtained from the estimation in
the previous section. The usefulness of different effect calculations and counterfactual anal-
yses depend on what researchers would like to know. In this section, I will first introduce
a way to interpret the estimated democracy interdependence (i.e., the estimated contagion
paths of political regimes) using the network-analysis approach. Next I will conduct a coun-
terfactual analysis for regime-change trajectories after a substantial democratic shock to a
country, starting from the fitted democracy levels using the last time period (1996-2000).
6.1 Estimated Latent Interdependence for Political Regimes
With spatial econometric models, it is usually difficult to grasp the true meaning of effects
simply by looking at the estimated coefficients reported in Table 2. For example, as men-
tioned in preceding sections, the regime interdependence can only be captured by a product
of the estimated coefficient and the given spatial weights, ρˆrWr or γˆL, but not simply by
the coefficients ρˆr and γˆr. A weights matrix Wr indicates how strongly a pair of countries is
interconnected and the coefficient ρˆr tells us how much this particular connectivity matters
in explaining countries’ democracy scores. It is sometimes useful to compute the overall
interdependence of countries by
R∑
r=1
ρˆrWr + γˆL. This quantity is the estimated latent struc-
ture of interdependence that explains and is partially explained by the level of democracy of
the included countries.
Existing works in spatial studies had conventionally reported the
R∑
r=1
ρˆrWr matrix to demon-
strate the estimated interdependence, but had never studied the characteristics of the infor-
mation contained in the connectivity matrix until (Hays, Kachi and Franzese, 2010). This
is somewhat ironic given that spatial studies are motivated by the very notion that there
are a number of political outcomes and behavior that cannot be explained only by the ac-
tors’ attributes; the strength of ties among actors is also an important determinant of such
phenomena. The following graphs exemplify some of the patterns of the implicit network
interdependence in democracy scores that were revealed by the estimation.
Most countries have at least weak connections with some countries, which makes the network
graphs tend to look very busy. Figure 4 demonstrates only the ties with high magnitude
(the 95th-percentile) among all the statistically significant ties at the 99% confidence level.
Figure 4-(a) (the top panel) shows such ties in the time period of 1971-1975 and (b) (the
bottom panel) is for the 1996-2000 time period. The size of edges indicates the strength of
the estimated ties. Since the estimated coefficient of the similarity matrix L is a negative
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value (-0.104), some cells of the overall interdependence
R∑
r=1
ρˆrWr+ γˆL have negative values;
however it turns out that all the negative dependencies are statistically not significant, leaving
in only the positive interdependence in the plots. The node size represents the democracy
level (larger nodes for higher democracy scores), and the node color indicates geographical
region.10 For example, an arrow from Japan to the Philippines indicates the influence of
Japan on the Philippines, or the Philippines “learning from Japan’s regime experience”.
As an example of over-time network change, Figure 5 shows the ego network of Thailand for
each of the nine time periods. The ego network is defined as a network that consists of a focal
actor (“ego” and in this case it’s Thailand) and the actors to which ego is directly connected,
as well as the ties among these “alters”. A big (red) circle in each plot indicates the location
of Thailand. There are various ways to analyze these plots. One might be interested in
the change in network density over time. Since the number of countries to which Thailand
is connected generally increases over time, the plots become “messier”; however, we never
know if the density of networks is going up or down over time until we compute it for each
year. Network density is commonly measured by the number of ties divided by the number
of possible pairs–in other words it is a measure of the proportion of ties formed out of all the
possible combinations in a given network. For the case of Thailand, the density has been
almost constantly dropping since the 70’s (see Table 3), even though the graphs might look
increasingly busy over time.
Table 3: Density of Thailand’s Ego Networks
’56-60 ’61-65 ’66-70 ’71-75 ’76-80 ’81-85 ’86-90 ’91-95 ’96-00
Density 50.00 41.07 49.17 41.34 28.92 30.65 22.68 20.61 15.58
Note: Densities are computed using UCINET ver.6.
6.2 Preliminary Counterfactual Analyses
For each set of observed or counterfactual data, there is a set of steady-state (or long-
run) levels of democracy to which countries eventually reach assuming that the observed or
counterfactual values for each variable won’t change over time. Clearly, time-invariance of the
variables is not a realistic assumption, but it is still useful to conduct some counterfactual
analyses. For example, it is difficult for us to foresee how a democratic change in one
country spreads across the world through the estimated interdependence until we simulate
such changes. Or a promoter of democracy might want to know how an improvement in the
10Black: Western Europe. Blue: Central and South America. Green: Middle East. Light blue: Oceania.
Light green: Asia. Gray: Eastern and Central Europe. Red: North America. Pink: Africa.
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Figure 4: Estimated Latent Regime Dependencies: High-Magnitude (95 Percentile) Cases
for the 1971-1975 and the 1996-2000 Time Periods
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average income level in one country affects the country’s own and other countries’ democracy
levels in the following years. Obviously this is where theories about diffusion matter.
As an example, I gave a substantial democratic shock to China (+2.0 in the UDS unit)
and observed how it changed the trajectories of all the countries’ democracy levels over the
following 20 years. For the spatial weights and the other variables, I used the values from the
last time period (1996-2000), except the dependent variable which was computed using all
the other variables and the estimated coefficients (i.e., the starting levels of the democracy
scores are the fitted values). If the system maintain those variables’ values in the following
years, the countries’ democracy scores follow the trajectories plotted in Figure 6-(d) (the
top-right panel of Figure 6). Eventually all the countries would reach their own steady-state
levels after many iterations, but I limited the length of simulation to 20 years (20 iterations),
because an extreme extrapolation would not be a good empirical practice and the values for
the explanatory variables fixed at the 1996-2000 level would become less and less realistic as
time passes.
With a +2.0 shock to China’s democracy level, the trajectories look like the ones in panel
(e). The curves for China are highlighted in black and bold in all the graphs. The difference
between the with- and without-shock curves can be seen more clearly in the last panel, (f).
Graph (f) plots the difference of the with- and without-shock regime trajectory: as can be
seen in the graph, the difference in the democracy score keeps going increasing for some
countries, but decreasing or remains the same for others. If the difference increases over
time, that means that the positive shock to China gave a positive influence to the country’s
democracy score and the (positive) gap between the original (no-shock) change in its regime
score keeps widening over time. China, obviously, as well as Maldives and North Korea
follow this pattern to a great extent.
The growing gap between the original trajectory and the trajectory after a shock mainly
stems from the effect of co-evolution. When the shock occurs, a country’s democracy level
jumps up or down depending on its country-specific characteristics and through the esti-
mated interdependence paths. Now with the new level of democracy in these countries, the
new connectivity is defined both by the similarity in the new regime scores and the exoge-
nous connectivities (i.e., trade and border). The new network now determines the level of
these countries’ democracy scores in the next iteration together with their country-specific
variables. The co-evolutionary dynamic generated by the evolving similarity connectivity
reinforces the direction of the regime change for most of the countries, whether upward or
downward. This is mainly why we observe amplified effects of a shock over time. This is
one type of history dependence, which is generated by the selection mechanism: the initial
condition and the initial direction of change set a path (weakly or strictly) for an actor
regarding its future behavior.
The effect of co-evolutionary dynamic becomes much more obvious when we compare panel
(f) with panel (c), which is the same difference but generated from a specification that does
not have the similarity (endogenous) connectivity. I used Model (2) to conduct the simula-
tions for panel (a), (b) and (c). Comparing (c) and (f), it is clear that we could underestimate
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Figure 6: Trajectories of Democracy Scores with and without a Counterfactual Shock in
China
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the effect of shocks if the actual process in democracies is closer to the specification with co-
evolution but we estimate the effect using the traditional spatial models, which only contain
exogenous connectivities.
7 Conclusion
This study revisited the meaning of diffusion in regime transitions and proposed a type of
diffusion path that has been overlooked in existing studies. I posit a theory that a country
form stronger dependency ties with countries that demonstrated similar democracy levels in
the past (homophily). Incorporating such country networks that are shaped endogenously (to
their past regime types) generates a co-evolutionary dynamic between the dependent variable
and part of the connectivity among countries. I introduced a new spatial estimator, “MSTAR
+ Co-evolution” model, in order to distinguish three processes that can determine a country’s
democracy level. The first type of process is where country-specific attributes determine the
level of democracy as typically suggested in the earliest democratization studies. The second
process is the traditional diffusion mechanism in which other states’ democracy levels predict
a country’s regime. Finally the third type of process is my theory of endogenous network
formation. This third process important to consider because the seeming diffusion effect
(the second mechanism) can be partially a mere consequence of countries’ self-selection into
peer networks, potentially inflating the estimated effect of diffusion in the existing empirical
studies. The empirical analyses find that other states’ democracy levels affect a country
“positively” through the endogenous (or the regime-similarity) connectivity.
The first implication of this finding is that a selection mechanism (homophily) exists in
political regimes transitions. Part of the estimated influence of others’ regimes that travels
through the exogenous paths (trade and border) in existing studies could be overestimated
due to the fact that countries self-select themselves into regime networks.
Another implication of the co-evolutionary dynamic becomes evident in the counterfactual
analyses. Since homophily (or selection) in democracy scores reinforces the current direction
of change in the the democracy score of each country, it generates a path-dependent dynamic
over time. The initial conditions influence the path that a country’s democracy score follows
later. Since this dynamic was not a part of traditional models, we were not able to test for
path dependency before. In fact, by using the tradition models for diffusion, one would be
implicitly assuming that regardless of the initial conditions (or a set of conditions surrounding
country A at one time period), country A would always reach its own steady-state level, x,
if the system runs for a long time. For example, which countries in the world have more
democratic regimes in a certain year does not matter to one’s long-run democracy level in
this framework. However, it should be intuitive for any social scientist that two worlds with
different distributions of regimes have very different implications for the political development
of a country. Introducing the co-evolutionary dynamic enables us to address this issue.
Lastly another implication that has not been discussed in this paper throughly (yet) is the
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exact working of path-dependence. As I mentioned earlier, the path-dependence generated by
the homophilic network-formation over time reinforces the current direction of changes in the
democracy scores. If this is the case, then there should be a border line/lines above which
countries head toward more democratic regimes and below which countries head to more
autocratic regimes. Eventually there should be several “convergence clubs”. Under what
conditions should we expect to observe a world with a complete convergence, dichotomous
regime clubs, trichotomous clubs, and so on? And why do we see a two-regime world
currently? To answer these questions, I will need to further explore the workings of the
co-evolutionary dynamic both methodologically and substantively. (Part of the attempt to
study analytically the working of path dependency that emerges from contagion and network
selection has been published in Franzese, Hays and Kachi (2012)).
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